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INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a discussion of the potential uses 
of privacy, confidentiality and anonymity in computerized 
conferencing. 
Section I begins with definitions of the concepts, their 
aspects and allied terms; and briefly discusses their use in 
general communications and problem-solving activities. 
Section II explores their use in social research, 
particularly the survey method, a field that may yield useful 
analogues for computerized conferencing. 
Section III outlines the various functions of privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity that have been proposed for 
their constructive use in computerized conferencing. 
Section IV reports various difficulties and compromises 
that have been encountered to date in striving to achieve 
true privacy, confidentiality or anonymity in computerized 
conferencing. 
Section V gives preliminary estimates of various ways of 
enhancing the concepts through computerized conferencing. 
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SECTION I: Background 
The inner thoughts of sentient beings are held in privacy 
until such time as they may be shared with others. The 
dissemination of private thoughts to others can be constrained 
by conditions of confidentiality or anonymity. 
In this report privacy is defined as the thoughts, 
emotions and actions that an individual does not share with 
others. Confidentiality constitutes the sharing of thoughts, 
emotions or actions with another party, who may also be given 
authority to share their content but not the identity of their 
originator. Anonymity consists of sharing of thoughts, 
emotions or actions, but with concealment or lack of 
identification of their perpetrator. When the constraints 
imposed by confidentiality or anonymity are removed, matters 
are no longer considered to be private but to enter into the 
public domain.
* 
The surrendering of privacy can be said to be either 
active or passive. Actively, a person may choose to divulge 
private matters to another, either because that person needs 
them for some purpose, or to meet some needs of their owner. 
Passively, social organizations, ranging from dyads to 
international organizations, may require knowledge of 
private matters to promote the common welfare; that is, to 
A fuller description of the principal terms, their origins, 
and their current usage in computerized conferencing 
nomenclature, appears in Appendix A. 
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protect the rights of a group against the individual or to 
guide the progress of the group through better knowledge. 
Frequently, the surrender of one's rights to privacy may be 
accompanied by stated or implicit guarantees of confidentiality 
or anonymity. 
At its most basic level the right of confidentiality has 
been recognized historically in such one-on-one relationships 
as physician-patient, attorney-client and priest-confesser. 
Violation of these relationships is at the heart of the codes 
of ethics of these followings and others, and societal 
sanctions frequently exist against those who would violate 
or in any way compromise the relationships. Compromise of the 
privileges usually may be sanctioned only under the direst 
circumstances, e.g., identification of the bearer of a 
serious infectious disease. The rights of the individual vs. 
society are less clear in cases such as the confession of a 
criminal act. In such cases both a profession and the 
society in which it functions may claim jurisdiction over 
the determination of the disclosure of matters given in 
confidence, and the affected person on occasion can be 
expected to assert rights of privacy in litigation against 
the professional or agency if compromises are made. Indeed, 
the degree and manner of the determination of private rights 
vs. societal rights can be an important distinguishing 
attribute of societies, e.g., the "Bill of Rights" of the 
United States vs. the "collective rights" of the People's 
Republic of China. 
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For most everyday societal activities, particularly those 
related to finance and commerce, privileges of confidentiality 
are extended rarely except in such sanctuaries as Swiss banks. 
Consumers frequently are chagrined to discover that their 
financial affairs, or even personal affairs, may be an open 
book to tax collectors, creditors, insurers, potential 
employers and others. In recent years computerized data banks 
have created means through which much information can be 
shared and interrelated quickly and efficiently by 
inquisitive parties. Frequently legislation and regulations 
do not appear so much to restrict the dissemination of 
"confidential" files as to set limitations upon the compilation 
of dossiers through data base interfacing, and, most 
curiously, to assert the rights of citizens to examine what 
is known or has been said about them. But even such basic 
rights would appear to be compromised as disclosures of 
interagency cooperation are made with disturbing frequency, 
and as those who go to the trouble to examine files, are 
dismayed to discover that information about themselves may 
be withheld from their view on grounds of "security." 
Historically, there has been little resistance shown 
towards releasing aggregated or anecdotal data as long as 
the individual is not cited as its source; i.e., that the 
individual's confidentiality is preserved. The American 
Statistical Association's Ad Hoc Committee on Privacy and 
Confidentiality asserted recently (1977) that, 
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"...of preeminent importance...is the need for 
achieving a balance between a person's fundamental 
right to privacy and society's need to acquire 
information for identification and measurement of 
its current dimensions and characteristics." 
In other words, the aggregate or anecdotal experience of 
the physician can be recognized as an essential ingredient of 
diagnostic skill; the attorney's experience contributes to 
the foundation of legal precedent; and accumulated 
confidential confessions undoubtedly inspire innumerable 
sermons. Consumers and their advocates are not likely to be 
upset by a bank's marketing research that designates average 
transaction size, by empirically-based actuarial tables, or 
by census reports derived from aggregated income tax 
compilations. 
The confidential anecdote has been institutionalized as 
the case history method in many professions, and the 
aggregation of confidential data is cited as a prime 
constituent of the nature of statistics by the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality. 
"The individual identification of a statistical 
record and its contents is held confidential from 
all except the persons collecting and compiling the 
aggregated data. Au individual's record is not used 
to determine any action that affects the individual 
except through the contribution of the record to 
statistical aggregates, averages, or measures of 
relationships. The very essence of statistical 
analysis is that the identity of individual units 
of which it is composed is immaterial. Individuals 
should not be identifiable in the output of a 
statistical system." 
The nature and constraints governing privacy and 
confidentiality are at least partially understood by the 
average citizen, and are tolerated or encouraged by all 
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governments. Only in the most extreme cases of political 
imprisonment has their total suppression been attempted. 
The rights of an entire people probably have never been 
suppressed uniformly except in the writings on "thought 
control" by science fiction and fantasy writers. Indeed, 
Merton (1957) asserts that without opportunities for 
privacy and confidentiality, the social structure itself 
would be threatened, 
"Otherwise, the pressure to live up to the details 
of all (and often conflicting) social norms would 
become literally unbearable...'Privacy' is not 
merely a personal predilection; it is an important 
functional requirement for the effective operation 
of social structure. Social systems must provide 
for some appropriate measure, as they say in France, 
of quant-a-soi -- a portion of the self which is kept 
immune from social surveillance." 
The use of anonymous communication is less frequently 
made and understood. Totalitarian governments may justifiably 
regard an anonymous slogan painted on the wall or anonymous 
pamphlet as a threat to their very existence. In more 
democratic societies sanctions usually will be invoked 
against anonymity only in cases of extreme deviant behavior, 
e.g., threatening letters or obscene telephone calls. Until 
recently the use of anonymous communication probably has 
been confined largely to communications by the elite who for 
various reasons chose to write letters to the editor 
unsigned or signed with a pen name, authored books under a 
nom de plume,  or contributed to worthy causes as an 
"anonymous donor" or "friend." Even governments will request 
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the attribution of remarks to a "usually reliable source" 
in the free press, or under a fictitious signature in a 
state-controlled newspaper or journal. It may even be 
questionable if many such communications are intended to be 
truly anonymous: the cognoscenti may recognize an old friend 
behind the pen name, only the very naive would believe that 
a "citizen" would dare to write a stinging letter of rebuke 
to a totalitarian state's captive press, and pathological 
killers have been known to plead anonymously for someone 
to "stop me before I kill again." 
Among non-elites anonymous expression seldom appears to 
have been available except under bizarre conditions such as 
the suspension of conventions and physical masking during 
fertility rites, e.g., modern Mardi Gras celebrations. More 
recently, however, the introduction of citizen's band radio 
has captured the popular imagination and the air waves are 
filled with the fanciful "handles" employed by users to mask 
their true identities [1]. Celebrities, however, seem to 
take pains to disclose their CB pseudonyms so that the 
ordinary citizen will know in reality "First Mama" is the 
President's wife. 
The structured use of anonymity is likely to be encountered 
only in the work of the research scientist or practitioner. 
In the social sciences, and particularly in the use of 
survey research, conditions can exist in which it is 
desirable to grant and ensure anonymity to research 
participants who are reporting upon their behavior or ideas; 
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that is, upon conditions that normally could not be measured 
accurately without full promise of anonymity. By use of 
methodologies utilizing anonymous functions, the researcher 
can promote: 
1. Interaction for the free exchange of ideas or the 
reporting of matters without any threat of disclosure 
of the same to peers or even to the collectors or 
compilers of the data; that is, anonymity can remove 
any threat that the privacy of personal data will be 
compromised. 
2. Objectivity through the masking of identity can 
serve to suppress distracting sensory cueing or 
ad hominem fallacies so that the matter being 
reported or discussed can be considered on its 
intrinsic merits without regard to personal origins 
or aspects of origin. 
3. Problem solving for the total subordination of the 
individual ego to the group task. Presumably 
anonymity can be used to suppress individual 
considerations that might hinder the group's progress 
in a mission, e.g., one would not have to worry about 
peer relations, advancement of unpopular ideas, risk 
ridicule, etc. 
Another form of anonymous function that may be emerging in 
the physical sciences is that characterized by journalists' 
pronouncements of the "anonymity" in "Big Science." 
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Journalists, scientists, students of the social study of 
science alike have noted for some time a growing trend in 
the physical sciences that is directing scientific inquiry 
away from the individual effort towards a necessary joint 
effort [2]. This development has brought about an approach-
avoidance conflict in which scientists recognize an 
absolute necessity for collaborative effort in certain 
fields, but equally recognize secondary consequences which 
make it difficult to reward equitably the contributions of 
individuals to the group enterprise. The resolution of this 
dilemma is far from clear, but a possible solution derived 
from computerized conferencing will be discussed in Section 
III. 
As privacy, confidentiality and anonymity function in a 
social setting, two further concepts, security and 
censorship, should be defined for the purposes of this 
report. 
Security is employed in the sense of preserving cognitive 
space or transmission in such a fashion that unauthorized 
access cannot be gained casually or sureptitiously, or so 
that any such attempt will at least be greatly impeded [3]. 
Censorship constitutes a denial of access to thoughts, 
communications or information that could be maintained in 
private, confidential, anonymous or public modes [4]. 
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SECTION II: Social Science and Survey Research Applications 
Privacy per se is a condition that may be discussed and 
described by the social scientist, but is of no functional 
use in scholarship or professional practice because it 
contradicts the basic scientific requirement to communicate 
ideas freely with one's peers [5]. 
Confidentiality, however, is a condition that has long 
been used by social scientists. In one-on-one relationships, 
the case histories of individuals revealing their most 
hidden thoughts, hidden perhaps even to themselves, has been 
a major foundation of psychoanlytic theory [6]. The 
confidence established through the client-social worker 
relationship undoubtedly has established the empirical basis 
for many social theories that have been derived from the 
accumulation of multiple experiences. The use of aggregated 
statistical data, usually collected with assurances of 
confidentiality, is a hallmark of modern empirical social 
science. The experimental subject's rights to confidentiality 
are being spelled out in the codes of ethics of the social 
science professions and in a set of interlocking federal 
directives in such detail that many researchers are 
beginning to worry that their ability to carry out projects 
may be debilitated [7]. Indeed, even the term "subject" is 
now seen by many as dehumanizing and as a threat to 
people's rights. Merton suggests there is an ambivalency in 
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the need to provide privacy to individuals and to provide 
also insights to human behavior to social scientists. 
...the social scientist is so often an object of 
ambivalence. This is why his inquiries are so often 
regarded as mere 'snooping' into 'private affairs.' 
Were it not for other, countervailing mechanisms in 
society -- such as the institutionalization of 
'privileged communications,' or 'data to be treated in 
utter confidence' -- neither the social scientist 
dependent upon free access to data on human behavior, 
nor the other professionals, such as the doctor, 
lawyer, and clergyman, who must also have this 
information, would be able to carry out their social 
roles. But since these social roles are instituionally 
defined to include unflagging restrictions on making 
observed departures from the code known to others, the 
band of observability of deviant behavior can be 
safely enlarged, without interfering with the 
functional necessity for 'privacy,' 'secrecy,' or 
'ignorance.'" 
Methodologies do exist for the granting of anonymity in 
social science research, but their need and application is 
comparatively new. Basically, two modes of anonymous 
protection have been used: 
1. Participant anonymity in which experimental subjects 
are identified to the researcher (who is constrained 
to hold their identities in confidence), but not to 
other subjects participating in the experiment. 
2. Subject anonymity in which experimental subjects are 
able to render private information and opinions 
without revealing their identity to the researcher. 
Various social science disciplines have developed means 
for the protection of anonymity such as the use of masks in 
psychodramas, but the most systematic means probably have 
-10- 
been used in survey research [8]. In survey research there 
are four basic methods that have been employed to afford at 
least operational anonymity to survey respondents. 
1. The ballot box technique emulates the anonymity of 
the election place by allowing respondents to 
place their completed survey questionnaires in a 
"secret ballot box." The interviewer does not have 
access to the individual's opinions or reports 
because the survey instruments are comingled. The 
technique also can be employed by allowing 
respondents to deposit their "votes" [9] through 
the mail independently so as to deny interviewer 
access to their reports. 
2. Respondent questionnaire selection frequently is 
combined with the ballot box technique. Respondents 
can select questionnaires randomly from a stack of 
questionnaires, or trade questionnaires back and 
forth so that the data collector has no knowledge 
of who is filling out which questionnaire. This 
technique normally forestalls any attempt to 
identify respondents through sureptitious coding 
mechanisms [10]. 
3. Mail surveys can afford a degree of anonymity in 
that the postmark usually is the only identifying 
mark. Even postmarks, however, now offer little 
identity because current postal practices 
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increasingly call for sectional denotation rather 
than more specific local or zone names in postal 
cancellations. 
4. A relatively new technique is the use of randomized  
response which was developed to afford anonymity to 
respondents in answering questions about such 
sensitive subjects as drug usage, child abuse, 
commission of crimes and other deviant forms of 
social behavior. In this technique a respondent is 
presented with matching sets of questions on 
socially-acceptable behavior. The respondent 
truthfully answers one of the questions, but does 
not tell the interviewer whether the answer is to 
the acceptable or to the non-acceptable question. 
(The respondent chooses the question to be answered 
through a randomization device such as flipping a 
coin.) Responses by individual cannot be identified, 
but the aggregate results can be calculated 
statistically, and frequently turn out to be higher 
and more in line with known incidence than those 
obtained through more conventional methods. To 
forestall any interviewer interpretation through 
visual cueing reception, the ballot box or mail 
survey mode frequently is used in conjunction with 
this technique [11]. 
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Operationally, all four techniques afford anonymity, but 
strictly speaking, respondent identity still could be 
established in most cases through the use of such devices as 
fingerprint identification or comparisons with previously-
known handwriting samples. Use of such extreme uncovering 
devices is highly unlikely now, but the potential for their 
use will increase rapidly as such devices as computer-
assisted fingerprint identification and optical character 
recognition become more refined and widespread. 
The more common techniques of personal and telephone 
interviewing afford only confidentiality because interviewers, 
and frequently questionnaire data compilers, may have access 
to respondents' names, addresses or telephone numbers. 
Practically speaking, however, legitimate research 
organizations institute safeguards to ensure the 
confidentiality of responses. Additionally, the combination 
of employee boredom, speed of processing, and sheer numbers 
is likely to create de facto anonymity; that is; compilers 
who process thousands of questionnaires a year are unlikely 
to take the time or the interest to identify individual 
responses. 
Still, the respondent, who rarely is aware of these 
constraints, is likely, and has every right to insist upon 
the protection of private data given in confidence in a 
survey. Misleading devices that intentionally threaten 
that right can create havoc. Sales organizations, 
particularly encyclopedia and magazine solicitation firms, 
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frequently conduct pseudo surveys to exploit the public trust 
in bona fide surveys for their own ends. Even reputable 
survey organizations have been known to use ultraviolet ink 
or other sureptitious means to mark questionnaires for 
control purposes. Public exposition of this practice has 
been greeted with outrage, and widespread reforms have been 
instituted within the survey field to forestall further use 
of the practice [12]. The practice of some behavioral 
scientists in using surveys and similar devices to disguise 
the ulterior objectives of an experiment is receiving 
closer scrutiny and it has been suggested that such ends 
do not necessarily justify the means if those means entail 
potential violation of human rights. 
In most forms of survey research, respondents are 
anonymous to each other, since the only interaction is 
between the respondent and the interviewer. One form, the 
focussed group interview, is employed to develop participant 
interaction to produce cross-fertilization of respondent 
ideas. A standard practice in forming such groups is to 
stipulate that respondents have not met prior to the session 
This affords a degree of operational anonymity in that 
participants are unlikely to feel that their statements 
will be identified outside the group by other participants, 
but peer pressures and visual cueing biases may still be 
present and vary in degrees of suppression only according 
to the random personalities of the group and the group 
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moderator's skills [13]. 
Delphi technique normally is thought of as a forecasting 
or problem-solving ("policy delphi") tool, and not as a 
survey instrument; although it can, and has been used to 
collect survey data. That it is not used more frequently 
to collect data is surprising because the technique can 
feature both participant interaction and participant 
anonymity [14]. Normally, subject anonymity is not attained 
in delphi studies because the individual's identity is known 
to the research compiler, who reiterates the previous 
response set back to the participant for comparison with the 
aggregate response. Compiler knowledge of participant 
identities would be necessary for evaluational and validation 
studies of the technique, but for conventional application 
could be circumvented easily with no probable loss to the 
experiment. 
Taxonomically, the delphi method can be viewed as a member 
of the class of structured group techniques that comprises 
simulation games and models. A distinguishing characteristic 
of some members of the class is that many are truly 
interactive; that is, they are directed by the participants 
and not by a moderator who is a researcher or a researcher's 
agent who sets the agenda for the group. Such exercises 
entail the need of a means of communications and typical 
examples utilize human referees or computers as referees 
that assess actions, relay messages, and introduce random events. 
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As will be discussed later, true interaction could be 
facilitated by the use of anonymity in computerized 
conferencing for simulation games and models, and probably 
extended to researcher-directed activities such as delphi, 
opinion research and other social research mechanisms. 
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SECTION III: Applications In Computerized Conferencing 
Computerized conferencing could be said to consist of 
the interactive use of private and shared cognitive space 
by individuals and by groups. 
This space can be structured through programmed or 
social conventions. 
Programmed conventions reflect the inherent 
limitations of the computer hardware chosen for a 
computerized conferencing system; the extant 
limitations of supporting software, including 
languages; and constraints or enhancements 
purposely introduced in the software package. 
Social conventions are guided by the constraints 
imposed by what is possible through use of the 
available programming; the awareness of the 
limitations and capabilities for cognitive 
transmission by members of the computerized 
conferencing groups; and the development of 
adaptive social mechanisms by individuals and by 
groups to compensate for limitations and constraints 
or to exploit inherent opportunities. 
To simplify matters somewhat, subsequent sections of this 
report are presented from the perspective of the Electronic 
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Information Exchange System (EIES) of the Center for 
Computerized Conferencing and Communications at the New 
Jersey Institute of Technology. EIES has been chosen for 
this exposition, not only because it is the computerized 
conferencing system most familiar to the author, but because 
it probably is the system most advanced in terms of developed 
applications and of use by a diverse audience of members. 
Turoff and Hiltz (1977) have identified four fundamental 
services that have been incorporated in EIES. 
Notebooks Personal communication space 
that may be shared with co-
authors, for the developing and 
editing of documents 
Messaging Dyadic or group communication 
space 
Conferencing Closed group communication space 
Bulletins Public communication space for 
on-line newsletters or journals 
They identify ten additional services that are in various 
stages of development for. computerized conferencing, four of 
which may be of some importance to the current discussion: 
Form generation and collection, 
A microprocessor that functions as a full-fledged 
conference member, 
Model and simulation activities, 
Directory. 
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All these applications can present both opportunities and 
pitfalls in uses entailing privacy, confidentiality or 
anonymity. 
In this section the opportunities will be explored; in 
the following section the pitfalls that have been noted to 
date will be discussed. It must be emphasized that although 
EIES bears strong resemblance to the salient features of most 
other computerized conferencing systems, both major and minor 
hardware and software differences in other systems could 
impose different programmed conventions with consequent 
differences in adaptive social conventions. 
Notebooks can be regarded as either private or 
confidential instruments. Privately, the individual can use 
the notebook to record, copy, arrange and synthesize thoughts 
and information in the manner that people in the past have 
used scrapbooks, diaries, filing cabinets and manuscript 
drafts. These private thoughts and syntheses can be shared 
with confidentiality. 
§ A joint private space or notebook can be created by 
inviting co-authors to assist in composition, critique 
and editing. 
§ Editors, peers, referees and others can be shown 
notebook contents with an understanding that they are 
not to be divulged to third parties without permission. 
§ Copies may be made for confidential perusal by others. 
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The notebook owner is the only person who knows which 
other members have access to the notebook; that is, those 
entering items into it will know who else may be reading 
their comments only if the owner chooses to tell them. 
Messaging presents the same opportunities, but 
programming conventions and early user behavior indicate 
that the recipients of messages can more readily transfer 
message contents to third parties electronically. The 
application of copyright laws to computerized conferencing 
communications is not always clear, but some have suggested 
that the recipient of a message can share in its ownership; 
that is, rights of confidentiality may be achieved only 
through observance of social protocol developed to protect 
those rights by mutual agreement by both the sender and the 
receiver of the item. 
Conferencing precludes privacy, but members could agree 
to confidentiality, and programming can be used to conduct 
all or part of a conference through anonymous interchange 
by participants who can elect or be constrained to enter 
their remarks under labels of "anonymous" or by use of pen 
names. The anonymous label is the more secure device in terms 
of preserving anonymity, but the pen name facilitates 
interchange by allowing other participants to follow a 
particular chain of thought or to direct questions and 
remarks to a specific participant. 
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The Bulletin in its preparation provides opportunities 
for anonymous interchange among authors, referees and 
editors. In its promulgation it can be employed as a forum 
for the anonymous expression of dissenting views, particularly 
those that may be politically or socially unpopular. Through 
use of pen names it can then become a public place for 
anonymous debate of those views. 
Form generation and collection can be viewed as the 
computerized conferencing equivalent or application of 
structured group processes such as survey research and 
delphi studies. As such, it can function in much the same 
manner as the mail survey technique described in Section II, 
but at greater speed, and with enhanced features such as 
programmed instruction to use filtering and branching 
devices in questionnaires automatically, to offer systematic 
explanatory notes, or to create possibilities for interviewer/ 
respondent interaction that cannot be attained in mail 
correspondence. In this manner, computerized conferencing 
can be employed to administer the simplest data gathering 
instrument or highly complex interactive tasks that 
synthesize a variety of group process techniques. 
Operationally, respondents can be granted confidentiality or 
true anonymity according to constraints presented in the 
particular exercise [15]. 
A microprocessor can be used to facilitate confidential and 
anonymous data collection. It can serve as an electronic 
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"interviewer" that has no interest in the identity of an 
individual save for processing purposes, and such entries 
can be erased permanently once preset conditions have been 
satisfied, e.g., prevention of double-voting, unauthorized 
voting, etc. Its ability to transfer information, however, 
can create problems as will be discussed in Section IV. 
Modeling and Simulation activities can be regarded as 
enhanced structural versions of messaging, conferencing and 
data collection. In addition, the activities could be 
employed to compensate for whatever a researcher may feel 
is lost in not possessing the identity of anonymous 
participants engaging in the activities. 
A particularly interesting application is suggested by 
Scher's (1977) review of Zuckerman and Horn's analysis of 
simulation game communication processes (1973) in which he 
concluded that computerized conferencing "...is in an 
outstanding position through its ... capability for 
anonymity (capability for deceit)." Within the current 
context this observation can be noteworthy on two accounts; 
1. It suggests that anonymity, used as a deceitful 
mechanism, may serve as a positive disruptive force 
in some future applications of computerized 
conferencing. 
2. By inference it could suggest that unmasking 
anonymous communications, although undesirable 
in conventional communications and problem- 
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solving activities, could be desirable in some artificial 
game modes that may be introduced in computerized conferencing. 
In the latter regard, it should be noted that 
communications intelligence in the form of intercept and 
identification most peculiarly is not a normal function in 
simulation conflicts, eventhough it can be a critically 
important component of real life conflicts [16]. 
The Directory contains the names of computerized 
conferencing network members, together with their mailing 
addresses, telephone numbers, and self-descriptions of 
characteristics and interests [17]. Associated programming 
permits other network members to obtain these descriptions 
or to conduct profile searches based upon key words to 
locate individuals with similar interests, or living in a 
given geographical area as defined by a postal zone or 
telephone area code. Although the directory promotes obvious 
advantages in presenting the means through which individuals 
of similar interests or propinquity can locate one another, 
it potentially is the source of abuses akin to those 
currently encountered through telephone directories and 
mailing lists: the computerized conferencing equivalents of 
crank or even obscene telephone calls may eventually be met, 
lists may be sold to commerical interests, and descriptions 
could be utilized by marketing researchers to isolate above-
average prospects for goods and services. 
The directory probably already serves to contradict an 
-23- 
important asset of computerized conferencing, cueing anonymity. 
As a verbal medium with only very limited graphic capability 
in present form, computerized conferencing constrains 
network members to judge received ideas largely in terms of 
their intrinsic, expressed merit, rather than by such 
potentially distracting elements as the ad hominem  
characteristics of the ideas' generators. This functional 
partial anonymity allows one to judge an idea without 
reference to tone of voice, oral emphasis, ambience of 
setting, facial expressions, body language, or similar 
non-verbal cues. In cases where conferees have not met 
face-to-face previously, judgments can be rendered without 
reference to physical appearance, age, perceived physical 
attractiveness [18], dress, or even sex [19]. A complete 
dossier can do much to reduce this advantage if it contains 
information that counteracts this aspect of anonymity [20]. 
Currently, directory information almost exclusively 
presents positive information about network members. 
Potentially, anonymous directory entries could be established 
that would allow members to establish connections for the 
exchange of information on socially-undesirable or sensitive 
issues or characteristics. Computerized conferencing could 
generate the electronic communications equivalent of the 
"anonymous" or telephonic "hot line" to enable members who 
wish to discuss such topics as alcoholism, gambling 
addiction, narcotics addiction, overweightedness, 
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homosexuality, extreme political opinions, and so forth, to 
contact others with similar problems, inclinations or 
expertise in the topics. Through use of pen names, such 
contacts could be truly anonymous in contrast to current 
encounters that frequently are only confidential, and 
compromised to the extent that disclosure or fear of 
disclosure is present. 
Another major component of computerized conferencing, 
that at the time of this writing was in developmental stages 
is the collection. The collection is a structuring device 
through which individual members or conferencing groups may 
define computerized conferencing items, and organize them 
according to personal or group preference. Although 
citational schema for authors are commonplace in other 
computerized systems, the EIES collection procedure goes 
further and allows the collector to list items authored by 
other members and even to incorporate listings of items 
from data files or documents not contained in EIES. The 
collection does not copy anything but merely references 
other existing items and allows whoever can read the 
collection to peruse those other items [21]. 
While collections are likely to be used initially by 
members and groups to organize notebooks and bibliographies, 
they also have the potential for becoming a structured means 
through which attribution and priority of contribution to 
group enterprises may be established and documented. In this 
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manner the group as it moves towards a consensus position 
would relegate each relevant contribution to the enterprise 
to its proper place. Retrospective searches of the final 
collection structure, and of interim structures, could be 
used to document the relative contribution of each member 
to the final outcome of the group's discussion or 
experimentation. In extreme cases in which a group member 
or sub-group of members disagreed with the consensus 
position of that process, as delineated by the overall 
group's collection, "minority collections" could be compiled 
to advance alternative interpretations of the group's 
progress and findings. The majority and minority versions 
could then be submitted to mutually acceptable peers for 
arbitration. 
Part or all of the discussion and experimentation, as 
synthesized and documented through collections could be 
conducted through anonymous or pen name communication. At 
a later date, as in a poker game, the true identities of 
the authors of successful ideas could be revealed at each 
author's option. By the same token, however, unsuccessful 
ideas, that authors would just as soon have everyone forget 
about, could be consigned to anonymous oblivion. It is 
hypothesized that the combination of collections and 
anonymity should foster freer and more productive group 
processes. All members of a group would be assured that their 
ideas, even when given anonymously, utlimately would be 
-26- 
properly acknowledged. Unpopular or highly speculative 
concepts could be advanced without fear of ridicule, 
recrimination or loss of peer standing, and anonymous 
challenge to any idea communicated could be made with 
similar protection. This promises to be a major shift from 
the results of more conventional media which frequently 
are characterized by reluctance to advance unpopular or 
nascent concepts, or to criticize the contributions of 
other group members, especially those who are superiors or 
acknowledged experts in the field of inquiry. Hiltz (1977), 
for example, has hypothesized that, 
"...negative reactions (Bale's categories 10, 11 and 
12) will represent considerably higher proportions 
of computerized conferencing comments, especially if  
the capability for anonymous statements is present in  
the system.... this should be an advantage of computer 
conferencing as a communication mode for problem-
solving, since it would represent less reluctance to 
criticize bad ideas, and should lead to more frequent 
high quality solutions." [Emphasis added.] 
The collection, however, can pose some threats to 
confidentiality. As it allows anyone viewing a collection of 
titles to obtain also the original texts, the conditions for 
inadvertent disclosure of confidential materials to third 
parties are enhanced. 
Pseudonyms and Masks  
The participant nature of computerized conferencing tends 
to produce procedures, conventions and protocols that are 
user-defined. This condtion has lead to new applications of 
the use of pen names beyond those originally envisioned. 
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Kerr (1977) probably was the first to point out and 
practice the use of the pen name in computerized conferencing 
as a social convention. 
"I use my pen name not in terms of cueing, but perhaps 
as what may be called protocol, something of a 
political sense to it, an agreement among friends to 
message each other in humorous ways. Sometimes in 
conferences, when I know it won't be anonymous, but 
when I want to make a point of this current self-
definition. 
That is, I see a real distinction between my use of my 
pen name and those occasions when I choose to be 
anonymous; the first is humorous and friendly, the 
second tends to be biting and sarcastic. But even the 
second has never been used in serious conferences to 
stab someone." 
Wellman (1978) carries this theme one step further and 
sees the use of pen names as masks that could enable their 
users to agree to suspend social conventions. 
"...rereading Durrell's The Alexandria Quartet, I was 
struck by the similarities between a masquerade and 
pen names in EIES. That is, it is not too tough to 
figure out who a pen name 'really' is, but even so they 
are useful. They are a way of distancing yourself from 
your own identity, and more importantly, your routine 
set of social roles, so that you can do/say new things. 
The masquerades (the classical Durrell kinds with black 
domino masks and balls in multiroom mansions) allowed 
people to say/do such things as carrying on affairs 
which they normally could not get into. Although most 
people 'knew' who each other were, the distancing 
effect of the mask allowed the polite fiction of 
anonymous liberty." 
In this same context a group of EIES members in an 
informal conference once adopted such identities as 
"Francois Marie Arouet," "Madame Du Chatelet," and 
"Diderot," and conducted their exchange in French in the 
manner of a salon dialogue of the period. 
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The potential for future development of complex masks 
and contrived social settings through computerized 
conferencing may be great. One can speculate that individuals 
will establish separate directory listings to match the 
traits portrayed by their masking pen names. Such 
descriptions could be particularly beneficial for those 
afflicted with psychological disorders entailing multiple 
personalities as a means of delineating their separate 
characters for themselves and those who seek to help them. 
In more rational discourse devil's advocacy could be raised 
to a refined level through adoption or assignment of 
stereotyped stances reflecting desirable points of view. 
Members of a conference itself, in addition to adopting or 
being assigned roles, could be constrained to conduct their 
dialogue in a manner reflecting an historical model, e.g., 
a socratic dialogue, a French salon, a discussion among the 
Encyclopaedists, an English science club, etc. 
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SECTION IV: Barriers 
Experimentation and use of computerized conferencing to 
date has been confined largely to comparatively elite groups 
of scientists, technologists and advanced students, many of 
whom have received their primary training in the physical or 
information sciences, and may thereby not be fully aware of 
the ethical considerations surrounding rights of network 
members to privacy, confidentiality or anonymity. 
Fortunately, most if not all, bring to the enterprise codes 
of ethics and practices developed through academic or 
professional practice that mitigate very strongly against 
any exploitation of their fellow members. It could be 
surmised, however, that as computerized conferencing is 
extended to a more general population, that members will 
then include the usual assortment of knaves and fools. It 
would seem imperative to design safeguards that would 
forestall the former and protect the latter. 
Some early computerized conferencing developers and 
experimenters have engaged in "fun and games" activities 
that have arisen spontaneously in recognition that 
anonymous functions promised for the medium can be 
compromised under extant programming and systems design. 
Pen names, for example, can be compromised through the 
following observed phenomena. 
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Time Coincidence  
Synchronously-received anonymous items can be cross-
referenced to members currently on line in the network at the 
time of receipt. Asynchronously-received items can be checked 
against suspected senders' last period of activity as listed 
in their directory descriptions. 
Traffic Analysis  
Participants tend to conform to set patterns of usage 
according to time of day, days of the week, and frequency of 
use. Examples: early sign-on, checking for messages before 
the end of the business day, types of items composed and 
transmitted during evening hours, use during weekends. 
Geographic location frequently can be noted because of time 
zones, e.g., eastcoast participants sign on early; westcoast 
participants are more likely to sign on later in the day. 
Participation  
Participants have a choice of a number of private and 
public conferences. Listing of those participating in the 
private conferences is available, as is a marker system 
denoting each member's progress in perusing the items in the 
conference. Listings and markers of this type are not 
available in public conferences, but participation gradually 
can be determined through noting contributors' names and 
through references to the conferences in other contexts. 
Response Time  
Members often vary according to their usual speed of 
response. Some answer questions or enter comments in 
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synchronous sequence or at least within an hour. Others 
respond over a lengthier period of time. 
Editing Sophistication  
A wide range of sophisticated word processing and 
programming techniques is available in advanced computerized 
conferencing systems. Naturally, relative sophistication in 
utilizing these devices to set formats, make corrections, 
display ideas graphically, etc. varies widely, as does the 
time lag between introduction of a new feature and its 
adoption for use by individual members. Newer members in a 
conferencing group may be conspicuous simply through 
observation of common new-user mistakes. 
Writing Characteristics  
Individual traits are displayed and recognized in terms 
of consistent spelling errors, typographical errors, use of 
abbreviations, common expressions, and use of jargon. 
Terminal Characteristics  
Some terminals can be used to send messages in both 
upper and lower case characters, others in upper or lower 
but not both, and others in upper case only (TTY). Those 
members having an option between upper and lower case 
generally appear to tend towards use of lower case for 
identified communications, but, interestingly, frequently 
appear to switch to upper case when communicating in an 
anonymous mode. Some terminals may be limited in terms of 
special characters, so that presence or abscence of symbols 
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can be discerned. 
Subjective Style  
Probably the most difficult characteristic of all to mask 
is one's writing style which can serve as a personal 
"fingerprint" for each communication. It seems likely that 
Fogg and Flesch readability-type measurements could be 
developed to identify individual authors. Intuitively, 
members in constant contact over a period of time come to 
recognize each other's individual styles through observation 
of such things as paragraph and sentence length, word 
sequence, vocabulary, grammatical form preference, and 
punctuation. 
Boasting  
Some participants cannot seem to resist the temptation 
to twit others about the source of anonymous remarks; others 
will confess to being the authors of anonymous traffic; some 
will attempt to mask the anonymous items through public 
comments that express wonderment about their source; and 
others simply will "protest too much." 
Compromise  
Inadvertently, an anonymous item might be entered that 
through time coincidence or subject reference immediately 
establishes a sole or limited range of sources. Triangular 
coincidence can occur when party "C" refers to a matter 
ennunciated by party "B" that identifies an item received 
earlier by party "A". Mechanical errors are very rare, but 
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when they do occur, inadvertent disclosure or compromise of 
private, confidential or anonymous traffic can take place. 
Somewhat more frequently, compromise can occur in the 
process of introducing new programming features that may 
offer opportunities for unforeseen disclosure before they 
have been thoroughly tested and debugged. 
Decoder Silence  
One of the subtlest rules of decoding anonymous 
identities is not to reveal success, but to maintain 
silence so that the compromised party does not alter pen 
names or traffic patterns, and so that others will not be 
alerted to potential dangers. A patient traffic analyst 
in this manner can reconstruct an entire network's anonymous 
identities over an extended period of time. 
Few of the techniques discussed above in and by themselves 
will reveal the identity of a member making anonymous remarks, 
but used in combination, even one who is deliberately trying 
not to guess at identities is apt to see through the 
masking intuitively. Because of frequent lack of sophistication 
in such matters by many, even the careful practitioner of 
anonymity stands ultimately to be revealed through a simple 
process of elimination. 
When it is considered that in times of war and in diplomatic 
intrigue, encrypted communications conveyed by highly 
sophisticated electronic means ultimately have been decoded 
and identified with spectacularly successful (or disastrous) 
-34- 
consequences, computerized conferencing traffic analysis 
would appear to be child's play by comparison. 
Security  
As in any computerized system, computerized 
conferencing's provisions for privacy, confidentiality and 
anonymity ultimately can be compromised through sureptitious 
entry into the host computer's data files. The degree of 
privacy afforded by a computerized conferencing system to 
the individual for use in private or confidential spaces 
will be dependent upon the security effectiveness of the 
system itself and the integrity of its implementors and 
operators. By definition, private and confidential spaces, 
and identification of adopted anonymous masks, are not 
matters to be shared with others and entry to such contents 
can be gained by another only through illegal means. 
Unfortunately, even the most secure system can be compromised 
by a determined, knowledgable person who can either pose as a 
legitimate user, or worse, gain entry to the system's 
programming structure, move freely within all system files, 
and then erase any evidence of illegal entry. 
It probably can be safely assumed that few, if any, 
conference members would attempt to secure illegal 
advantages for themselves. Further, the mature computer 
conferencer is not likely to pursue any elaborate course of 
traffic analysis, because of recognition that privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity functions can be of mutual 
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benefit to all members. This assumption notwithstanding, 
however, current system design inadequacies and participant 
naivete can combine to aid inadvertent disclosures of 
anonymous identities. 
Confidentiality Protocol  
Confidentiality poses problems that cannot always be aided 
simply through enhanced design or programmed safeguards, 
because it relies more upon the mutual trust of all members 
concerned. The fragility of this trust was well demonstrated 
in one heated debate that took place in an informal 
conference. (See Appendix C for a transcript of the debate.) 
A member of the conference took strong issue with the 
current suggested protocol for treatment of confidential 
items. 
"If a private message is sent to you, it is considered a 
a breach of confidence to copy it to another person 
without explicit permission from the author. Because it 
is very easy to copy to others the messages one 
receives, without this norm of asking permission to 
copy, one could never be sure that confidential 
messages would remain so. 
If you send a message to someone like a conference 
moderator and you don't mind if it is copied into the 
conference or to other conference members, say so 
explicitly [22]." 
The individual who objected to this protocol rested his 
arguments against its adoption on assumptions that it: 
§ is uneforcable, 
does not rest on any current legal rights, 
§ could contradict other conventions that the source 
of ideas should always be acknowledged, 
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§ inhibits free speech, 
§ would be an incumberance entailing separate agreement 
with all correspondents. 
Unfortunately, the only substitute agreements he offered 
are reducible to "let the sender beware" or "trust me" 
conventions. 
Neither of these suggested substitute protocols were at 
all agreeable to the other conferees in the debate, who 
instead suggested that failure to adhere to confidentiality 
conventions and courtesies could: 
compromise and take advantage of the naivete and 
trust of the new conferee, 
§ lead to uncertainty and inhibit personal 
communications, 
§ entrap anyone not aware of a receiver's presumed 
"right" to compromise any assumed confidentiality, 
§ inhibit side discussions considered necessary for 
clarification or for preparation of more formal 
public remarks, 
§ lead to conditions of alienation in extreme cases. 
Those endorsing the EIES confidentiality protocol 
argued that it could be enhanced by: 
§ requirement of explicit statements of intent by 
anyone not intending to abide by it, 
§ insertion of explicit instruction to not copy any 
communications considered to be especially 
 confidential, 
§
 use of discretion in communicating confidential 
matters until such time a new correspondent is known 
well enough to be entrusted in such matters, 
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§ addition of programmed conventions that would 
disallow at the sender's option, a message to be 
copied, 
§ or, all else failing, discipline of the asocial 
behavior in this regard through extreme reduction 
or total suppression of all further communication 
with the miscreant party. 
A false sense of confidentiality can be created through 
the use of blind copies of messages. Normally, the addresses 
of messages are indicated in the message banner, but some 
systems allow the sender to suppress this information. This 
could create the false illusion for the receiver that he or 
she is the sole recipient of the message, when in fact others 
may be receiving it as well. In formal experimental settings 
blind copies might very well be sent to experiment monitors 
without the knowledge of the experimental subjects to whom 
they ostensibly are directed exclusively. This practice 
could call into question concerns about human subject rights. 
Blind copying of the subjects' own messages to a monitor 
without their knowledge would, of course, be a case of 
simple electronic eavesdropping. 
Anonymity Abuses  
Additional abuses of anonymity functions have been 
hypothesized and tested through the fun and games of early 
computerized conferencing experimenters. First, pen names 
can be misappropriated by others if programming constraints 
against this practice are not present. Very simply: one 
could use a recognized pen name as one's own and create 
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mischief. One could even set a proper name of a member as 
a pen name if safeguards are not taken. Such manipulation 
could be very subtle and deceiving to the uninitiated who 
are unaware of computer programming capabilities. For 
example, programs could be set that would allow only one 
person to enter a given name or pen name, but a clever 
computer forger could make use of non-visual characters 
to fool some programs, e.g., set John (space) Smith as 
John (control key) Smith. In the example given, both 
forms would appear identical on the printed transcript 
or CRT screen display, but would be treated as being 
quite distinct by the system's central processing unit. 
Secondly, it is assumed that as computerized 
conferencing becomes more widespread, it will become prone 
to such annoyances of alternative communications media as 
abusive or obscene messages sent by anonymous or pen name 
mode. The problem would be compounded by the misuse of the 
pen name as suggested above; that is, asocial messages sent 
under a misappropriated name or pen name would create even 
greater mischief. 
Interfacing Compromises  
In the future as computerized conferencing systems 
proliferate and as larger networks are formed and 
microprocessors and other hardware are used to interface 
a given system with other systems, both programmed and 
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social conventions may be altered in ways that would pose 
threats to members' rights to privacy, confidentiality 
and anonymity. The means for electronic transfer to 
another system would exist and that system might not 
contain the same programmed safeguards found in the 
system in which the member originally enters an item. Once 
an item is transferred to another system the author may no 
longer have a say in the social conventions governing 
protocols concerned with the protection of privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity. Further, for very valid 
reasons, a person who participates in more than one 
computerized conferencing system, may just as soon not have 
system "A" know that equivalent or related data are being 
used in system "B" [23]. 
Monitoring Abuses  
Computer systems are susceptible to monitoring by outside 
agencies. Hiltz and Turoff (1978) suggest that systems could 
be programmed to check traffic for certain words and phrases 
and inform authorities when a word such as "murder" has 
occurred so they could then obtain a warrant to read the 
item. They report that some suggest this could be considered 
the right of police to patrol but not a violation of privacy 
or eavesdropping because no human has actually read or 
"heard" the item text. Although this reasoning may sound 
quite sophistic, stranger events have occurred in the name 
of "law and order" or "national defense." 
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SECTION V: Suggested Enhancements 
Security. 
Ultimately, the most effective means to protect privacy 
and to maintain confidentiality and anonymity in 
telecommunications probably will be attained through the 
use.of computer-assisted cipher encoding and decoding. 
Until relatively recently the only truly unbreakable 
cipher has been the "one-time pad;" a random number-based 
system that is successful, but both time-consuming and 
logistically complex in its administration. A more 
promising method has been suggested by Gardner (1977), 
and is based upon the "trapdoor codes" of Diffie and 
Hellman (1975) and the subsequent proposal for the use of 
prime number signatures for such codes by Rivest et al. 
(1977). Operationally, codes of this type promise the 
development of double encoding mechanisms utilizing 
encoding and decoding algorithms which feature unique 
identifiers for both sender and receiver based upon factors 
of prime numbers. The ciphering system is such that the 
encoding mechanism can be made public, so that it would 
have practical use in group situations as in computerized 
conferencing, but the decoding algorithm for each member 
is maintained in secrecy. Without the decoding algorithm, 
it has been estimated that current computer technology 
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would require millions of years to decipher the encoded text. 
The procedure also provides a unique signature for each 
member so that no member's signature can be forged. It 
would appear to be just a matter of time before appropriate 
hardware and software will be developed for the automatic, 
user-transparent implementation of these methods for public 
use in applications such as computerized conferencing. 
Member Rights  
The form feature could be used to inform computerized 
conferencing members of their rights to confidentiality and 
anonymity. Statements devised by a conferencing group or 
those embodying the requirements of federal regulations or 
professional codes of ethics regarding the rights of 
experimental subjects could be transmitted to the members 
as a message form. The participants' receipt of the form 
would be registered automatically and the sender would receive 
written confirmation of the date and time of receipt. More 
positive acknowledgment could be obtained by also including 
within the form a question form such as that shown below. 
I HAVE READ, UNDERSTOOD AND AGREE TO THE CONDITIONS 
GOVERNING MY PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE. (Y/N/?) 
[if ?] 
I REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION BEFORE AGREEING 
TO PARTICIPATE: (ENTER YOUR QUESTIONS HERE.) 
The use of such a form would provide several distinct 
advantages over current methods: 1) It provides both the 
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member and the experimenter or group leader with full 
documentation of all agreements. 2) Participant questions 
can be answered directly by the experimenter or group 
leader instead of through an intermediary such as a survey 
interviewer or computer console operator who may not be as 
qualified to understand all aspects and implications of 
the questions. 3) The asynchronous nature of computerized 
conferencing gives the participant sufficient time to 
consider the question of participation before reaching a 
decision. 4) Interaction should be less awkward than what 
may occur when an interviewer or other agent reads to the 
participant his/her rights in the fashion of a police 
officer reading to a criminal his/her rights to remain 
silent. 
Special protocols may have to be developed to protect 
member rights of confidentiality in notebooks. Because a 
notebook owner is the only person with direct knowledge of 
who else is reading the notebook, the potential for 
entrapment of confidential material by third parties 
unknown to an author will exist. This problem could be 
alleviated through requirements that a notebook owner 
either inform all notebook authors of who else has access 
to the notebook, or that a statement be given to all 
potential authors that anonymous readers of the notebook 
are present. 
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Thwarting Inadvertent Disclosure  
System programming could be employed to eliminate some 
sources of anonymous unmasking. 
Anonymous or pen name items could be converted 
automatically to TTY (upper case only) format. 
6 Special terminal characters, especially control 
key functions, not commonly encountered could be 
disallowed in pen name communication. 
User-specified or systematic time delays could be 
incorporated to eliminate establishment of time 
coincidence disclosure. (Such a feature would have 
to vary according to context; a synchronous activity 
might feature a maximum delay of ten minutes' 
duration, an asynchronous conference might allow a 
maximum of 48 hours.) 
6 Future developments in word processing would 
eliminate common misspellings. As EIES Interact 
language evolves, users may very well develop 
their own procedures to edit for the elimination of 
such self-recognized problems as poor spelling, 
split infinitives, dangled participles, and 
sentences ended with prepositions. 
Preventing Misappropriation of Pen Name  
When members are given a free hand in setting or changing 
pen names, potential abuse, as discussed earlier, exists for 
using a pen name to mimic the proper name or pen name of 
another member. This potential abuse has been forestalled by 
two principal means: 1) at the elementary level of- programmed 
conventions that do not allow the use of another member's 
name as a pen name; 2) by the use of distinctive identifying 
marks such as "John Smith" or John Smith*  to denote that the 
name is a pen name. 
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The mimicry of pen names or their cognates could be 
forestalled through adoption of programmed conventions that 
would disallow further use of any pen name previously, but 
not necessarily still being used, entered for a given period 
of time, e.g., the duration of an exercise, 30 days, six 
months, one year. 
Confusion can occur when pen names are used to mimic 
official-sounding titles such as system monitoring titles, 
government agency designations, or institutions. Social 
conventions disallowing the use of such names could be 
established and reinforced by authorization of system 
monitors to censor out any such pen names as they occur. 
Minimizing Misapplication of Pen Names  
The social use of pen names discussed earlier, although 
useful in some contexts, can become a liability in more 
serious discussions. The user of the pen name could adopt 
uncharacteristic attributes associated with the self-
perception of the pen name, and other conference members 
could attribute positive or negative characteristics to its 
user. To cite just two examples observed in EIES conferences: 
"Wonder Woman" for some might evoke images of a militant 
feminist, and "Alvey Singer" of a Woody Allen-type eccentric. 
This creates a synthetic problem in which the original 
purpose of the pen name, the creation of anonymity and 
elimination of ad hominem judgments, is replaced by 
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potentially complex fictitious assumptions about an idea's 
generator. 
The resolution of this problem would appear to lie in 
the use of the military-type code book compilation of 
blocks of standard pen names that could be allocated to 
groups for use by their members. Each member would be 
assigned one or more names to be used within the group. 
(Cross-group usage would simply aid others in establishing 
identification through elimination processes.) The names 
would have to be selected carefully to minimize 
hierarchical, ordinal or anthropomorphizing effects. For 
example, proper nouns of natural objects could be used, 
such as: 
Ash, Beech, Birch, Maple, Teak (but not Oak or Ebony) 
Mallard, Oriole, Sparrow, Tanager, Wren (but not 
Hawk, Dove or Loon!) 
Member Item Deletion Control  
One of the simplest, but most effective means for 
providing privacy and confidentiality is to allow a member 
to delete an item. Quite commonly, members in most systems 
may delete any item they originally authored. In a private 
space such as a notebook this presents few problems. In a 
confidential space such as a message system or conference 
problems can occur because those receiving an item may be 
able to copy it before the author has a chance to delete it. 
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This difficulty could be overcome by programming conventions 
that would allow an author to specify that an item be 
deleted automatically upon receipt. 
There are occasions when the receiver of a message may 
wish to be able to exercise the privilege of deleting it 
because it is felt it contains information that should not 
be a matter of record or copied elsewhere. Programmed 
conventions could be developed to provide this option. 
Members should be fully informed of the computerized 
conferencing system's definition of "deletion." To some it 
might come as a surprise to learn that an item that to 
their mind has been deleted may still actually exist in the 
computer memory, because only the system link to that item 
has been deleted. In such cases the potential exists for an 
operator to retrieve the supposedly deleted item. In those 
systems in which the memory supposedly has been erased as 
a condition of deletion, the potential for recovering the 
erased item may still exist. Expensive devices have been 
developed to recover computer memory information that has 
been accidentally erased, and such devices since they deal 
with digitalized data can be more effective than those used 
in attempts to recover the complex impulses of erased audio 
recording tapes. 
Member Reception Control  
As currently constituted, computerized conferencing 
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gives the individual member little control over messages 
that are sent to the member. Currently this presents 
difficulties only in terms of information overload, viz., 
lengthy items from verbose correspondents that arrive at 
inopportune times. This generally creates only minor and 
transient problems. The potential, however, for receiving 
truly unwanted material, ranging from junk mail to obscene 
or threatening messages sent anonymously, creates a need 
for greater user control of reception. Fortunately, computer 
architecture creates possibilities for exercising such 
control without involving system operators in complex 
questions of carrier responsibilities and ethics; that is, 
systems can be programmed to exclude classes of items upon 
reasonable user request without any human operator having to 
have knowledge of the excluded senders, or for that matter, 
of those requesting such exclusions. 
In the case of nuisance items such as those that may 
contain obscene material and which are sent 
anonymously, programs could be devised by which a 
user upon receiving such an item could enter a 
command that would tell the system that no further 
items that are unsigned (anonymous or pen name) can 
be transmitted to the user from the member who sent 
the miscreant item. The anonymous messager in such 
an instance would be informed of this condition 
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upon trying to send any further anonymous items 
addressed to the aggrieved party. 
§ Program conventions could be introduced to prevent 
the transmission of such matters as obscene words 
or racist pejorative words. (Such conventions, 
however, would have to be examined carefully to 
determine the extent to which they could 
constitute prior censorship.) 
§ To cut down the flow of computerized conferencing 
junk mail equivalents, conventions could be 
established that: 1) Members can request their 
names be removed from any address lists for 
prespecified classes or origins of traffic; that is, 
obtain rights to removal from lists as can be 
obtained in conventional mailing operations. 2) In 
recognition that some unsolicited items can be of 
potential, but unpredictable, value, senders of 
such materials could be assessed full costs of 
sending and receiving. 
Confirmation  
Ultimately, the seemingly innocuous confirmation of 
received items could become an important aspect of 
computerized conferencing communications. Unlike most 
conventional telecommunications media, the sender of an item 
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does not always have assurance that the person receiving 
an item is the intended person: it could very well be 
received by an operator using the terminal on the 
designated recipient's behalf or by someone who is sharing 
the intended recipient's network membership. The sender may 
not always be aware of such conditions and could be trapped 
into sending information not intended for third parties. 
Currently, the only practical resolution of this problem is 
to restrict sending of such items to times when prior 
synchronous assurance has been obtained from the intended 
recipient that he/she is in fact utilizing the receiving 
terminal and that others are not present. In the future, 
personal decoding algorithms, as discussed earlier, should 
circumvent this problem. (Their use would also constitute 
certification of receipt.) 
Interfacing Conventions  
The problems that will be created through the interfacing 
of computerized conferencing networks or through conference 
access and transmittal to other computerized systems are far 
from clear, but it is anticipated that conferencers will find 
themselves confronting problems not unlike those now created 
through merger of data files by government and private 
agencies. 
As microprocessor and other computer-assisted interfacing 
capabilities emerge it may become necessary to develop 
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concomitant programmed conventions to ensure that conferencers' 
rights are not compromised inadvertently or through malevolent 
action by those understanding the weaknesses of such 
arrangements. At this time three constraints that could be 
imposed on an interfacing system can be hypothesized. 
1. Members should receive automatic notification upon 
each and every instance that information they have 
authored in a conferencing system or information 
about their behavior in using that system is 
transferred outside the system. 
2. Protocols and conventions should be developed through 
which categories of member information or member-
authored items can be transferred only with prior 
and explicit consent by the member. 
3. Members should never be required to rely solely 
upon system facilities to undertake all transfer 
operations, but should be given options to 
undertake these activities themselves through 
whatever off-line channels they may have access to. 
In this manner, the individual member can exercise 
greater control over private, confidential or 
anonymous intellectual and behavioral property. 
Expediency vs. Participation  
Undoubtedly, implementation of these suggestions and 
other safeguards undertaken to protect computerized 
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conferencing members' rights to privacy, confidentiality and 
anonymity will prove to be irksome in some instances to 
members, conference operators and conference leaders alike. 
It must always be borne in mind, however, that what may 
sometimes appear initially to be a programming barrier or 
impediment to smooth communications or group processes, may 
in fact later prove to be an important element that will 
actually improve upon those processes. In the final analysis, 
human rights and intellectual and psychological freedom can 
be at stake in these issues, and "expediency" and the natural 
desire to attain quick implementation of exciting new 
technologies should never be allowed to compromise the human 
element that constitutes the very reason for their development. 
The early experience of computerized conferencing has 
suggested that it has outstanding potential to become a 
truly participant-directed computerized medium. Unlike most 
other computer applications, computerized conferencing leads 
to hands-on experience for its members. Most, after they 
overcome the short initial mechanical difficulties, become 
quite adept at using the new system. To their pleasant 
surprise they discover that they do not require support 
personnel to assist them in the use of their terminals and 
that they can perform a wide range of functions for themselves. 
Once this confidence has been acquired, many then turn to the 
system itself and to varying degrees ask, or even demand, to 
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participate in its further design and refinement. By the same 
token, system operators and designers are confronted with 
sophisticated users who no longer passively acquiesce to 
their decisions, but to their surprise offer counter-
suggestions for system enhancement. At this point the line 
between users and implementors becomes increasingly blurred. 
Implementors find they must accomodate user-defined social 
conventions, and special languages such as EIES Interact 
are evolving to permit users to construct their own programmed 
conventions and structures within the system. 
This trend undoubtedly will continue, and computerized 
conferencing systems will become more participant-defined in 
their applications. In the context of the current discussion, 
this should mean that network members will be in a better 
position to ensure the protection of their rights to privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
It is likely that some groups, notably those that are 
industrial, military or governmental in orientation, will at 
least initially resist participant direction. They may be 
expected to desire the retention of more conventional 
organization hierarchies and knowledge of the communications 
by subordinate members. It should be interesting to note the 
ways, if any, in which such stances in turn will succumb to 
member demands for greater participation in conferencing 
processes and structural definition. Future experience may 
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demonstrate that organizations may evolve in ways that will 
replace centralized and hierachical structures with 
decentralized participant structures. 
-54- 
SECTION VI: Conclusions 
Historically, privacy, confidentiality and anonymity have 
facilitated cognitive interaction. The development of 
computerized conferencing both enhances and presents new 
challenges to these conditions. 
Computerized conferencing for the first time offers facile 
and effective anonymous communication within a structured 
environment. As such, it facilitates the attainment of a 
long-sought goal: the judgment of ideas and information 
without respect to their origins or distracting ad hominem 
cueing elements. This development both improves upon previous 
communications modes and creates opportunities for the 
construction of more sophisticated group interaction 
mechanisms attuned to the complex needs of contemporary 
science and society. 
As is the case with most technological developments, 
computerized conferencing has been handicapped initially by 
psychological and mechanical shortcomings encountered in the 
transition from the previous technology to the new 
technology and its associated cognitive structures. It would 
appear, however, that as experience is gained through use of 
the new medium, structured means are being developed to 
overcome the barriers that compromise the effective use of 
privacy, confidentiality and anonymity. 
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Cognitively, computerized conferencing creates an 
environment in which the proper relation of private to public 
ideas is better understood. Mechanically, programming 
structures are being developed to protect user privacy and to 
employ confidential and anonymous modes properly in 
promulgation of group members' private cognitive property 
into syntheses of policy and scientific structures. 
It is hypothesized that through computerized conferencing, 
privacy, confidentiality and anonymity will develop into 
formal, recognized modes of expression and cognition that 
will be beneficial to both individuals and to the society of 
which they are a part. 
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APPENDIX A: Nomenclature 
In contemporary usage, "privacy," "confidentiality" and 
"anonymity" unfortunately frequently are treated by many as 
synonyms. Roget's Thesaurus, for example, lists privacy and 
confidentiality as synonyms, and further appears to 
emphasize their association to the pejorative aspects of the 
terms, e.g., stealthy, sly, underhanded. Confusion of these 
terms with anonymity is rarer, but in the survey research 
field at least, confusion of anonymity with confidentiality 
appears to be relatively commonplace. 
Dictionary definitions appear to assign more specific 
meanings to the terms. Consider first, the meanings of privacy 
that seem pertinent to this inquiry. 
Privacy 1. The state or condition of being withdrawn 
from the society of others, or from public interest; 
seclusion. 
2. Private or retired places; private apartments; 
places of retreat. 
b. A secret place, a place of concealment. 
3. Abscence or avoidance of publicity or display; a 
condition approaching to secrecy or concealment. 
4. A private matter, a secret. 
5. Intimacy, confidential relations. 
6. The state of being privy to some act. 
* 
The definitiions cited in this Appendix are taken from the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Only those definitions 
pertinent to the scope of this report have been included. 
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Private 1. Withdrawn or separated from the public body. 
3. Kept or removed from public view or knowledge; not 
within the cognizance of people generally; concealed, 
secret. 
4. Of a thing: Not open to the public; restricted or 
intended for the use or enjoyment of particular and 
privileged persons. 
c. In many connexions private is used to distinguish 
something that is not open to the public, or not 
publicly done or performed. 
Although there is some suggestion in these definitions 
that there are confidential aspects of privacy, these 
definitions are listed secondarily to stronger senses of 
personal privacy. The sharing of privacy would seem to be 
done only in the most intimate or highly privileged manner. 
In this sense, current EIES nomenclature of "private 
notebooks" appears to be an appropriate use of privacy, but 
"private messages" would appear to be too broad a designation. 
This interpretation appears to be reinforced by 
definitions of confidentiality. 
Confidential 2. Of the nature of confidence; spoken or 
written in confidence; characterized by the communication 
of secrets or private matters. Confidential communication: 
a communication made between parties who stand in a 
confidential relation to each other, and therefore 
privileged in law. 
3. Betokening private intimacy, or the confiding of 
private secrets. 
4. Enjoying the confidence of another person; entrusted 
with secrets; charged with secret service. 
Confidence 1. The mental attitude of trusting in or 
relying on a person or thing; firm trust, reliance, faith. 
5. An object or ground of trust. 
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6. The confiding of private or secret matters to another; 
the relation of intimacy or trust between persons so 
confiding; confidential intimacy. 
7. A confidential communication. 
8. Trustworthiness, as a personal quality. 
Confident 1. Trustful, confiding. 
Confide 1. To trust or have faith; to put or place 
trust, repose confidence in. 
4. To impart as a secret, to communicate in confidence. 
5. To entrust (an object of care, a task, etc.) to a 
person, with reliance on his fidelity or competence. 
Note above in particular that confidentiality entails 
elements of implied communication, trusting and 
trustworthiness not associated with privacy. The last 
definition cited is particularly interesting as it would 
appear to place the onus upon the receiver not only for 
fidelity, but for competence in maintaining that fidelity as 
well. The definitions associated with confidentiality would 
appear to be superior as a description for the implied trust 
in computerized conferencing messaging. At some future date, 
consideration might be given to labelling messages as 
"confidential messages" on the premise that recipients may 
be less prone to betray a confidence than to claim ownership 
of something which by definition, or only through extensive 
negotiation, may no longer be private. In certain instances, 
it might also be helpful to use terms such as "confidential 
notebooks" and "confidential conferences." 
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The definitions of anonymity are straight-forward, and 
suggest there should be little confusion with either privacy 
or confidentiality. 
Anonymous 1. Nameless, having no name; of unknown 
name. 
b. Hence ... A person whose name is not given, or is 
not known. 
2. Bearing no author's name; of unknown or unavowed 
authorship. 
The OED defines "pen name" simply as a pseudonym, but 
it is noteworthy that in the definition of anonymous, the 
suggested derivation is from the Greek 'αv (private) + 
s/ olµα (name). In this sense it is the equivalent of the 
modern pen name. 
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APPENDIX B: EIES Policy Statement, Murray Turoff, Oct. 1, 1977 
PRIVACY AND OWNERSHIP  
The written material in a system of this sort has a cer-
tain degree of uncertainty with respect to ownership under 
copyright regulation, common law treatment of mail or various 
laws governing computer data bases. However, our NSF contract 
contains the following: 
"Provide complete security and confiden-
tiality of user's research information 
in transit through EIE(S) or stored in 
EIE(S).The Contractor will take all 
steps necessary to assure that data 
stored in the EIE(S) system will be 
confidential and that no one but the 
original user who stored the informa-
tion and data will have access to these 
data. These data are the result of re-
search projects not funded by this award." 
Under this clause we shall do everything reasonable with-
in budget and available technology to insure your privacy on 
an individual or group basis. We further interpret this clause 
to mean that we can refuse any requests from outside parties 
such as other government agencies for any EIES material. We 
shall, therefore, refuse to provide such information and will 
instead direct such parties to the author of the material re-
quested. 
However, I must point out that EIES is a Communication 
system as well as an Information system. We Cannot take any 
responsibility for what use members of EIES make of any mate-
rial directed to them by others. Thus, the system participants 
should be governed by the same ethical considerations governing 
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private or professional communications. We take the position 
that material entered in PUBLIC conferences, notebooks and 
bulletins may be quoted as one would with any other open pub-
lication. Therefore, authors should indicate in these public 
files when they are entering preliminary drafts whether it 
should or shouldn't be quoted (as one would normally do with 
a pre-print draft). As to private and group messages, pri-
vate conferences and private notebooks, the individuals and 
groups involved must establish their own standards for han-
dling the privacy of their material. Also, we hope the eval-
uators for each group will establish clear policies for his or 
her group. 
You should be aware that the EIES technical staff can, if 
necessary, gain access to any material entered in the system. 
However, they are well aware of and sensitive to the need not 
to violate privacy. In some rare cases you may find a need 
to request us to fix something for you requiring that we exer-
cise this power. In any such case you will be notified of 
this occurrence. For example, in a hardware malfunction, a 
data record of some sort may be damaged and the process of 
fixing it may require a check to verify that the right text 
item has been restored. Hopefully this will occur infrequently. 
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STATISTICAL DATA REPORTING  
Our contract states in reference to our monthly progress 
report: 
"For each user and for each group 
of users the data will be presented 
under the following headings: num-
ber of messages or transactions, 
type of transaction (message, con-
ference, etc.) and EIE(S) connect 
time." 
Therefore, each month a statistical report will be fur-
nished NSF listing each user's monthly and accumulated statis-
tics for the following items in terms of sent/composed and 
received: 
-- number of private messages 
-- number of group messages 
-- number of conference comments 
-- number of notebook pages 
-- hours of use' 
-- number of times on. 
However, NSF has assured us that all they need is the 
information reported for an individual identified by a code 
which does not inform them of who the individual is. The 
key to the code will be kept at NJIT and the subset for any 
particular group will be provided the principle investigator 
for a particular group. 
A copy of the NSF report will be provided each individual 
responsible for the evaluation of a particular group. In any 
internal evaluations of the EIES operation that we make our-
selves it will be our policy in any of the resulting reports 
or papers to maintain the anonymity of users concerning the 
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representation or analyses of data on usage. We will request 
that all the group evaluators follow the same policy before 
we issue these reports to him or her. 
For any particular group more detailed data will be 
available to the group's evaluator through the principle inves-
tigator and he or she will have policies for handling data 
derived from your group's activity. 
However, I must point out that even without specific names 
mentioned, data presentations may make it easy for some partic-
ipants on the system to identify certain members. For example, 
during the past year I have been the most frequent user and 
anyone else who has been using the system can identify my data 
point on any distribution of usage. 
Together with the evaluators we hope in the next year to 
develop firmer concepts of what are meaningful measures of per-
formance and impact in systems of this sort. We shall do our 
best to keep you informed of progress in this area. 
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APPENDIX C: Discussion of Copying of Prviate Messages 
The moderator of an informal conference disagreed with the 
EIES protocol convention on message confidentiality, prompting 
the following heated and insightful exchange of opinion. (The 
names of the participants have been replaced by designations 
of PERSON A, PERSON B, etc.; pen names by "ALPHA," "BETA.") 
C117 	CC210 	PERSON A 	 8/ 8/77 2:01 PM 
I have just received the new instruction booklet for EIES 
[Turoff and Johnson-Lenz 1977] and would like to take 
exception to "3. Maintaining the Privacy of Private Messages." 
1) It is impossible to enforce the not sending of messages 
onto others, and 
2) I believe legal tradition gives letters to the person who 
receives them, and 
3) I neither like to keep secrets nor wish to appropriate 
others' ideas as my own. 
C117 	CC211 	PERSON B 	 8/ 8/77 	9:19 PM 
Re Person A's 210: 
Knowing this is your point of view about privacy, I am 
going to be very careful about what I send to you as a 
private message. Several times already you have copied into 
conferences messages I have sent to you privately and never 
expected to see in a conference. So far, nothing embarrassing 
or too private has been shared, but I never know. As of now, 
I will only be sending messages to you, Person A, that I 
consider public. That may restrict my communication with you, 
but so be it. 
C117 	CC216 	PERSON C 	 8/ 8/77 10:09 PM 
Is this system like a letter or is it like the publication of 
an idea which you should be able to copyright or its 
equivalent. It's neither and a little of both. Afraid Person 
A, I agree with Person B. 
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C117 	CC217 	PERSON A 	 8/ 9/77 	10:02 AM 
I'm not sure how to put this. I would rather that Person B 
didn't send me something than that I had to consider it 
private. I agree with Person C that exactly what a msg is 
is a little difficult to define, but I would rather copy a 
msg than the ideas in it. Also, I would never want to make a 
profit at the expense of someone else's ideas. 
Sometimes I do have the good sense to "not bother 
bringing something up." At least one person in this 
conference should realize that. If it is clear to me that 
something is sent privately, and it does not appear to be 
concerned with a shady or illegal matter, I won't bring it up 
with anyone else; but if someone is going to send me anything 
like that they should make that clear in the body of the text, 
and know that I am not happy to be receiving such messages. I 
feel this way for essentially the same reasons I got involved 
in a rather heated argument earlier. 
This may be a bit brash, especially considering where I 
work; but as I indicated earlier, I don't intend to play by 
those rules. End of sermon... 
C117 	CC219 	PERSON D 	 8/ 9/77 	1:24 PM 
I have to agree with Person B regarding the practice that 
has to be adopted in messaging you, Person A, and I feel I 
must follow the same policy. 
Actually we or at least I should thank you for being so 
explicit about what you intend to do or not do, and therefore 
clarifying for us what to do when messaging you. But the 
rather petulant and obtuse attitude you continue to display 
in CC217 shows, I think, that you are missing the point about 
degrees of exclusivity or privacy which many of us find a 
valuable dimension of this system -- as it is in "regular" 
life -- and because you take the view you do you are cutting 
yourself off from a kind of relating and communication that 
this system offers. 
It is not that shady or illegal matters are private, and 
everything else can be public. I hope we aren't discussing 
shady or illegal matters in "private" or here (this is just 
as public and just as private as telephones or telegrams, in 
general). 
The point as I see it is that some things, perhaps often 
of a critical nature but sometimes also of a comforting or 
caring or connecting nature, come across much more 
authentically and fully if they can be said to the person 
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for whom they are intended alone. Not that I or we 
particularly want to have that kind of private access right 
now to you, but we might want to have it in the future, and 
we regret that that possibility is removed by your 
announced policy. 
In general, if one wants to send a message to another on 
the system and wants to be sure that only that person does 
see it and does not copy it to others, this can simply be 
said at the beginning or end of the message. The recipient 
is then honor bound to abide by that request, or at least 
to request permission to copy saying to whom he/she wants 
to copy, to the original sender. Conceivably it should be 
possible to program the system to electronically "fix" some 
messages so that they could not be copied, and this would be 
a command added by the sender at the time of sending. But I 
hope that will not be done. It is better for our 
relationships to and with each other on this system if we 
manage our messaging with mutual respect for each other's 
wishes regarding confidentiality. 
C117 CC223 	PERSON B 	 8/ 9/77 	2:25 PM 
I sent a poem to my love 
and hoped she'd hold it to her heart. 
I didn't ask her to be discreet 
Since I had written it just to her. 
Why did she show it to her friends 
who laughed, not knowing 
that my heart sang 
as I wrote? 
C117 CC225 	PERSON A 	 8/ 9/77 	2:45 PM 
My being is not me, 
for I cannot see me, 
but if you ask me to show myself 
I'll show you you as me. 
I talk in vicious cycles, 
never knowing quite why 
other's try to hide themselves, 
and I can't show what I try. 
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Sing of joy, I cry... 
but only tears prevail, 
for what I see is 
horrible 
I'll fight it 'till I die. 
If I hide in platitudes, or 
wallow in the mud... 
I'm just as damned in solitude 
as in the public flood. 
No need to follow my path 
You can as soon sink within your own. 
But if you don't give me my path, 
I'll damn your very bones. 
(I'm going to add a warning to my description...) 
C117 CC226 	PERSON E 	 8/ 9/77 	2:49 PM 
About the privacy and copying issues: To me, it's simply 
a matter of trust, as Person B put so well earlier in this 
conference. Person A's CC210 was interpreted, by me and I 
think by others, as stating publicly that he can't be trusted. 
This copying norm has received some scattered attention on 
line; it is an important issue, but clearly also one that 
avoids a simple answer. My own opinion is that it's a 
question of common sense, good manners, courtesy and trust. 
These are constructed as we get to know people electronically, 
as we "test" them, and as we learn how they can be trusted. 
The private message system component of EIES is crucial for 
the conferencing component for many reasons, including 
clarification, letting off steam, side comments on ongoing 
issues, etc. 
Person A, another aspect of this that disturbs me is 
your messaging me several times that you didn't "really know 
me," wanted to get to know the "real me" better, etc. Now, 
what would you have done with that info, anyway? Person A, 
you ask Person F to relate to you, accusing Person B of being 
"reluctant to become involved in our learning about each 
other." On the basis of the messages following that, can you 
now understand why they, like I, feel this way? I feel very 
strongly that the entire issue is a question of trust, and 
that you have clearly stated, many times, that you neither 
want nor deserve our trust. If this is "bouncing off each 
other," it cannot be helped. 
-68- 
C117 CC227 	PERSON B 	 8/ 9/77 	2:50 PM 
I don't see this as a free speech/free press issue. Rather, 
for me it has much more to do with trust among people 
communicating in this electronic wonderspace. Just as I know 
friends and neighbors whom I can't trust to always be 
discreet (and so I don't tell them sensitive things), so 
there are probably people in a cc environment who similarly 
pass things along that I might not like to see made public. 
Person A, perhaps I can come to a working compromise. If I 
clearly label private messages to you as private, will you be 
willing to keep them that way? Then you don't have to be 
responsible for figuring out what's confidential and what's 
not. I would be willing to follow this arrangement with you. 
C117 CC228 	PERSON A 	 8/ 9/77 	3:23 PM 
I am reasonably happy with the arrangement, you don't have to 
label every msg, just the topic. What bothers me is that the 
norm EIES is promoting will require that I come to the same 
understanding with everyone. As I think that information 
should be generally free, I really would prefer if the 
understandings would be made the other way around. If I have 
to make that understood to everyone I meet on line I won't 
have room in my [directory] description to say anything else 
about myself. 
I don't see this as a matter of trust, to me it is a matter 
of the cost of information...Person E, I can be trusted when 
it is clear to me that there is something about the subject 
which would restrict (as a matter of course) the logical 
audience to myself. I hope that you understand. 
C117 CC230 	"ALPHA". 	 8/ 9/77 	4:25 PM 
"The norm EIES is promoting" is the only reasonable one to 
promote. Only some information should be free. I do think, 
however, that you must make your position clear to- everyone 
you speak to on line. 
C117 CC231 	PERSON A 	 8/ 9/77 	4:48 PM 
Why is it reasonable? What is my position? Why would I want 
to send copies to everyone, or of everyone's, I speak to on 
line? And having fully expressed myself, I think that 
Person E's norm of feeling people out to decide what part of 
them is public makes the most sense (I think I slightly 
mangled what she said). For your benefit, if I give you 
anything I would rather were not public, it's my problem, -
not yours. 
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Person B, is there any item of yours which I have 
entered into this conference which you considered to be 
based in emotion rather than factual information? I think 
that it is up to people to speak their own emotion, I can 
make mistakes. 
Come on folks, what's the difference between doing it 
and admitting that you're doing it? At least by admitting 
that I am doing it I have gained some idea of when I should 
not be doing it. 
C117 CC233 	PERSON C 	 8/ 9/77 	8:21 PM 
Actually people the norm you are referring to and that 
particular section of the booklet was ghosted by Roxanne 
[Hiltz]; however, I agree with it as it stands in the sense 
that many new users will not initially realize how easy it 
is for a message to get circulated around so I would rather 
see the initial emphasis this way to alert people. 
C117 CC240 	PERSON D 	 8/10/77 	9:11 PM 
I think you will find, Person A, that your recent bullying 
statements have excluded you from getting any further 
messaging of significance from most of the other people in 
this conference. That is too bad, since this is the 
conference you claim you were given because of your threat 
tactics. Pyrrhic victory, I'd say. Good bye until the wind 
changes 	 
C117 CC241 	"ALPHA" 	 8/10/77 10:09 PM 
I, like Person D, will no longer speak to you, in this 
conference, except perhaps, and less frequently, through this 
pen name. Somehow, it makes me feel less vulnerable to your 
tactics. 
C117 CC247 	"BETA" 	 8/11/77 	8:41 PM 
Hypothesis: 
You people are just bored with the range of topics in this 
discussion now, and you want to migrate to something new and 
different. (Electronic Casanovas??) 
Second hypothesis: 
Some of you have felt more free to say very negative things 
to one another here than you would ever have said face-to-face. 
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C117 CC248 	PERSON G 	 8/11/77 	8:54 PM 
Perhaps Person A's dilemmas were anticipated by Ursula LeGuin 
in "The Dispossesed." In that book, it's clear that a 
thoroughly anarchistic society is paradoxically highly 
dependent upon a very heavy internalization of norms by its 
members; otherwise you can't trust them to behave socially 
on their own volition. Norms aren't just stifling; they give 
predictability. 
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APPENDIX D: Identities and Role Definitions in Computerized 
Conferencing 
By Elaine B. Kerr 
We are concerned with the kinds of interpersonal 
processes and phenomena that occur in computerized 
conferencing which correspond to phenomena in non-electronic 
society and which are unique to the electronic mode. The 
presence of electronic social forms constitutes the basis of 
a sociology of the world of electronic group communications. 
We want to probe where and how the electronic medium may 
distort or reshape structures, functions, and processes 
common to other kinds of social interaction -- like mirrors 
in a fun house -- and we want to explore the consequences. 
Electronic social relationships are those in which 
communications among individuals and groups are electronically 
mediated. Human communications are assisted and structured 
by a computer. The Electronic Information Exchange System 
(EIES) is one such computer-mediated technology from which a 
social system has emerged. 
Unlike conventional social forms, interaction in 
computerized conferencing is not face-to-face, geographically 
proximate, or necessarily synchronous. Electronic groups are 
theoretically and substantively very different kinds of 
emerging social forms, rather than simply extensions or 
replications of existing social structures, processes, and 
interaction patterns in conventional groups and organizations. 
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This paper is intended to contribute to the morphology of 
electronic group life by highlighting one practical issue: 
the implications of the use of pen names for personal identity 
in electronically mediated groups. 
Because written communications are substituted for 
conventional face-to-face or telephone interaction in 
electronic groups, standard non-verbal cues (such as smiles, 
frowns, and other body language) are either replaced by 
functional equivalents or are unavailable [24]. The pen name 
capability in computerized conferencing, as demonstrated in 
EIES, may serve either as a cueing feature or as an identity 
mask, depending in part on the context and purpose of the 
specific interaction. New role definitions, self-images, or 
masks can be deliberately donned, tried on for fit, worn on 
approval, and exchanged as often as the wearer chooses. 
The abscence of non-verbal cues is frequently perceived 
by new users of computerized conferencing systems as a 
troublesome barrier to effective communication. The pen name 
feature, however, can serve in unique ways to partially 
counter this and other problems. 
The pen name feature acts, in part, to counteract the 
tendency of conventional face-to-face meetings to be ruled 
by dysfunctional and irrelevant criteria. People are able 
to communicate in a computer-mediated meeting without 
reference to their physical appearances or auditory 
qualities. Ideas and other achieved statuses are relevant to 
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the written exchange of ideas, rather than ascriptive 
characteristics over which the individual has no control. 
One of the many advantages of computer conferences over 
face-to-face meetings, which ensues in large part because of 
the capability of commenting with a pen name or anonymously, 
is the reduction of social inequality as it affects groups 
such as minorities, women, and the handicapped, since the 
user may elect to mask particular status cues. Equally 
important is the ability to disguise cues irrelevant to 
professional and scientific dialogue which do exist in 
general collegial communications, such as age, race, 
beauty, physical size, loudness of voice, body language, 
mannerisms, assertiveness, socio-economic status and 
organizational position. Users may choose to reveal or hide, 
accentuate or ignore, certain personality, social, and 
cultural characteristics which would be readily apparent in 
communication by other media. 
Pen names can hide cues which could distract more than 
enhance the quality of group communications, especially when 
a group is convened with a mission of scientific inquiry and 
communication, rather than simple socializing. 
The very nature and quality of the contents of 
communication may undergo major alterations as the pen name 
assumes over time a unique personality. This personality 
may or may not reflect its human source, as the user may or 
may not allow abberant or exaggerated dimensions of his or 
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her personality to emerge and take shape. Aspects of the 
self that one might be reluctant to expose to one's 
professional or social peers may be revealed because of the 
presence of the pen name option. 
Part of the design philosophy of EIES incorporates the 
user's ability to send messages or enter conference or 
notebook comments in one of three modes chose: with a 
signature, a pen name that he or she selects and may change, 
or anonymously. The three options, in their message format, 
appear as follows: 
M 10584 	ELAINE KERR (ELAINE,114) 	8/ 1/78 7:26 PM L:1 
This is the sample text of a message. 
M 10585 	"JANE ADAMS" 	 8/ 1/78 7:27 PM L:1 
This is the sample text of a message. 
M 10586 	(ANONYMOUS) 	 8/ 1/78 7:27 PM L:1 
This is the sample text of a message. 
Unconventional configurations, not common to other social 
forms, are made feasible by the structure of the system. 
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The possibilities in the message system look like this: 
SENDER 




Pen Name * * * 
Anonymous Planned future possibilities 
Cells noted above by asterisks denote the parameters of 
concern. Although it is not now possible to address messages 
directly to specified anonymous recipients, this feature is 
planned for future implementation, and suggests even more 
complex and unknown consequences as anonymous-to-anonymous 
interaction becomes possible. Anonymity, or the masking of 
identity by the usage of a pen name, is further increased in 
any of the cells above except the normal message system, as 
a result of the ability of any user to copy an item 
received to any other user. In other words, with message 
passing, the sender of an unsigned item need not have been 
the recipient of the original item being responded to. 
Message passing produces anonymous receivers as well as 
anonymous senders. 
These unique patterns can produce certain kinds of 
attitudes and behaviors which otherwise would not likely 
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exist. They permit defined lines of thought to be pursued 
without the necessity of revealing one's identity or 
unmasking the identity of others. In the EIES public 
conferences, the receiver of items may choose to remain 
anonymous by either non-response or unsigned response; in 
private conferences, however, item recipients cannot easily 
remain anonymous since conference markers are automatically 
updated unless the user deliberately changes his or her 
marker. 
Pen names on the EIES system are unique. The first 
individual to choose one has ownership rights until he or 
she elects to change it. 
Pen names can also be used for tension-release 
purposes to alleviate overwork and ease the strain of late 
hours. Yet another function of pen names is to enhance or 
raise questions about a user's identity and characteristics. 
Pen names can be used to foster the unencumbered 
submission of controversial positions in serious on-line 
work efforts, although this has not yet been conducted in 
anything but an ad hoc way. 
The pen name feature has also been used for administrative 
reasons, but again for purposes other than those for which it 
was originally intended. An administrative use has emerged 
with a prefix such as (NOW 112) or (AS 902) to indicate 
recent or impending changes of membership identification 
numbers. Some users, particularly those who are new, use a 
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variation of their proper name as a pen name. This is 
probably a result of confusion between the pen name and 
the nickname as system identifiers. The phenomenon of 
shared names constitutes the third aspect of this kind of 
administrative use. An associate or spouse who shares a 
membership on the system may use his or her proper name as 
a pen name to distinguish communications from those 
emanating from the listed member. An institutional name 
may be used as a pen name when several people from the same 
organization share membership with the listed member. Or a 
guest may be listed by his or her proper name as the host's 
pen name when on line for demonstration or other temporary 
purposes. All together, thirteen such administrative uses of 
pen names were found in a sample listing of 185 pen names on 
line. 
Yet another use of pen names involves masking, deception, 
or charades in the attempted violation of the system's 
assignment of unique names to its users -- what one person 
referred to as "electronic rape." For example, a user under 
a pen name identification admitted to establishing 
Roxanne (Control D) Hiltz as a pen name, which would appear as: 
ROXANNE HILTZ 
To deal with this potential deception by clearly distinguishing 
pen signatures from real signatures, a design change was 
implemented to label pen names in this form: 
"JANE ADAMS" 
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The pen name and anonymity features are among the 
elements of informality deliberately built into the system 
to attempt to overcome the impersonality and coldness that 
many associate with computers. The design assumption is 
that social needs are real, legitimate, and necessary for 
task achievement. Features such as pen names promote 
informal and less serious exchanges, and in this way can 
function as electronic substitutes for the pre-meeting 
chatter, coffee breaks, or cocktail hour. Other tension-
release mechanisms that have emerged on line include informal 
conferences, both planned and unplanned on-line "cocktail 
parties," and a temporary encounter-type session. 
Pen names may serve as a tool for the temporary 
redefinition of self. They reflect changing attitudes, 
values, and cognitive structures, and permit new kinds of 
role-playing and symbolic behavior, especially by 
experienced and sophisticated users of the system. (New or 
infrequent users are unlikely to be sufficiently familiar 
with the system's mechanics to fully explore these kinds of 
possibilities.) But the mask may be torn off and the true 
identity exposed. One likely consequence is that the pen 
name will be changed, and attempts to conceal the new name 
may be more strenuous than before. 
The masking of identity is more difficult to sustain 
with the usage of pen names than by anonymity, since the 
pen name can assume a more focused and clear identity over 
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time. (For example, in the Encounter Conference, "ALVEY 
SINGER" emerged as the trouble-maker, "GERTRUDE MCFUZZ" as 
the feminist, and "THE EIES COMPUTER" as the threatening 
authoritarian.) 
We can make guesses about the author of a pen-named item, 
but must realize that, for example, a male might deliberately 
choose a female pen name, or vice versa, to avoid 
identification. We can make suppositions about the 
circumstances under which particular pen names are used, but 
must remember that the pen name may stay constant while the 
context of its usage changes. 
We would like to know the varied effects of pen name 
usage on the different audiences addressed. Does receiving a 
pen-named item make it more likely that the reader will 
respond at all, and that the response will in turn be 
signed with a pen name? It would be useful, but is not 
possible, to examine the proportion of time in each 
conference that members utilized their pen names or one of 
the alternates. Does the use of pen names contribute to the 
frivolous waste of electronic space, as some might argue, or 
does it instead serve as a valid tension-release mechanism? 
We do not know, and cannot simply determine, given the 
protections for user input built into the system, the 
answers to such intriguing questions as: 
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o How are pen names chosen? 
o What factors influence their choice? 
o How frequently are they used? 
o In what contexts are they used, discovered, and 
changed? 
o The characteristics of those who use the pen name 
feature compared with those who do not 
o How secure users feel using pen names compared with 
anonymity 
It would be useful to investigate changes in the kinds 
of pen names chosen over time. The nature of such trends in 
content could clarify the uses to which the pen name 
capability is applied. We might be able to note and predict, 
for example, that certain kinds of pen names tend to be 
chosen by certain kinds of users in specific contexts. The 
relatively small time period under review, the likelihood 
that only a small proportion of users have yet made full and 
frequent use of their pen name capability, and the relatively 
small but growing system sophistication of these users, 
however, makes this line of inquiry now impossible. (Users 
have been questioned as to their pen name habits, but this 
request was not made to all users of the system, and not all 
who were queried did respond.) 
Two listings were constructed on pen names in use on the 
EIES system: one yielded 141 names for the almost 400 users 
then on line, and the second, culled from a review of three 
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conferences, produced 44 additional names. These lists do 
not always tell us if the name has ever been used, the 
frequency of its use, or its duration. And we cannot, of 
course, match pen names with specific users. Although some 
of the identifications are known to us, they must remain 
confidential. We have on-line access to some but not all of 
the communications with pen name signatures. 
Of the 185 pen names accumulated, twelve mutually non-
exclusive and overlapping categories were discernible. 
CLASSIFICATION  EXAMPLES  NUMBER  
Male Michael, Masked Man 39 
Female Madame Curie, 
Elizabeth 15 
Passive or 






Humorous Baron Wed Wabbit, 
Chuckles 26 
Mythological or 
Fantasy Thor, Merlin 11 
Science Fiction 
or Space Spaceman, R2D2 11 





Foreign Bolshoi Brat, 
Catherine the Great 6 
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Problems Janem, 	Imjed 37 
An analysis of the comparative length of items in two 
conferences was performed. The first, Conference 119, was 
a private, informal, leaderless, and unstructured conference 
entitled "Encounter Session." Twenty-three conferees 
produced 230 comments between August 1977 and June 1978. 
The second, Conference 1005, is the "Wisdom" public 
conference, open to all members of the EIES system. An 
unknown, but probably large number of participants, entered 
a total of 112 comments since October 1976. This, too', is a 
leaderless, informal, and unstructured conference. Compared 
with Conference 119, Conference 1005 had fewer themes, and 
the topics which did emerge seldom achieved sustained 
discussion. 
CONFERENCE 119 
Length Signed Pen Name Anonymous Total 
1-5 lines 51 (46%) 59 (76%) 35 (74%) 145 (63%) 
6-49 lines 59 (54%) 19 (24%) 7 (16%) 85 (37%) 
TOTALS 110 (100%) 78 (100%) 42 (100%) 230 (100%) 
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CONFERENCE 1005 
Length Signed Pen Name Anonymous Total 
1-5 lines 10 (34%) 26 (65%) 28 (65%) 64 (57%) 
6-49 lines 19 (66%) 14 (35%) 15 (35%) 48 (43%) 
TOTALS 29 (100%) 40 (100%) 43 (100%) 112 (100%) 
Conference 1005 has a higher proportion of unsigned 
items than Conference 119, but this is a consequence of the 
heavier use of anonymity there. The frequency of pen name 
usage is essentially the same in the two conferences. 
In Conference 119, although almost half of the entries 
are signed, pen names are used almost twice as often as 
anonymity. In Conference 1005, the distribution is much more 
even. 
Both conferences have a preponderance of relatively short 
items, which is not surprising in view of their informal 
nature. Also in both, the signed items are longer than the 
unsigned. This suggests two possibilities: that those going 
to the trouble of typing in longer conference comments wish 
their efforts to be recognized, or that those choosing to mask 
their identities with either pen names or anonymity 
deliberately keep their items short in an effort to avoid 
detection through use of identifiable syntax or word choice. 
Of the shorter items, a higher proportion are signed in 
Conference 119 and anonymous in Conference 1005. 
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NOTES  
1] In addition to CB radio, social observers, of course, 
have noted the use of "anonymity" in mob behavior and in 
the masking function of the automobile; and the 
distressignly disastrous outcomes of such behavior. 
2] See Price (1963). One recent paper on a nuclear physics 
experiment was co-authored by no less than 79 people. 
Some delphi studies and similar structured group 
exercises could be said to have been written by 
literally hundreds of co-authors. The authors listed for 
the published results of such exercises might more 
properly be termed editors or facilitators. A recent 
publication derived from EIES (Turoff et al. 1978) was 
edited by seven people who organized their own 
contributions and those of 28 other people who had 
contributed to three computerized conferencing groups. 
3] Illegal entry to computerized data files and processes is 
an omnipresent threat to the privacy, confidentiality and 
anonymity functions of all computerized systems. The 
subject has been treated extensively elsewhere, and lies 
beyond the scope of this report which discusses these 
matters mainly in terms of those authorized to use the 
computerized conferencing system. 
4] By definition it would seem that censorship in a 
computerized conferencing system would disallow members to 
maintain privacy, confidentiality or anonymity. A 
conferencing system could be maintained without these modes 
of use and expression, but most of the applications 
discussed here could not be obtained. 
5] See, for example, Kuhn (1970) and Storer (1966). 
6] The sanctity of this relationship was underscored by the 
conviction of John Ehrlichman for authorizing the illegal 
seizure of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records. 
7] A full discussion of the appropriate statutes and regulations 
can be found in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Privacy 
and Confidentiality (1977). 
8] A comprehensive review of results obtained under differing 
degrees of confidentiality and anonymity can be found in 
Deutscher (1972). 
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9] The technique was developed and used by the American 
Institute of Public Opinion (the "Gallup Poll"). The 
analogy to election anonymity and terminology is so 
strongly embedded that to this day Gallup Organization 
and other Princeton-based researchers commonly refer 
to survey questionnaires as "ballots." 
10] This technique most commonly is used in employee 
relations surveys to forestall common fears that 
management will be able to trace opinions back to 
disgruntled employees. The picture of a manager 
seeking to determine the identity of the author of a 
critical message in the company suggestion box has 
been long a favorite of cartoonists. 
11] See Warner (1965). 
12] A discussion of the most recent cause celebre in this 
vein appears in Dickson et al. (1977). 
13] Telephone conferencing has been employed only very 
rarely in the focus group mode, and to the author's 
knowledge has not been evaluated systematically. It 
is assumed that a telephone conference focus group 
would present considerable mechanical, moderating and 
voice-cueing difficulties. 
14] Reliable statistics on the comparative incidence of 
delphi and focus group surveys are not available, but it 
is the author's estimate that in the United States focus 
groups probably outnumber delphi studies by a margin of 
at least a thousand-to-one. 
15] A full discussion of the probable future use of 
constraint models in computerized conferencing appears 
in Scher (1977). 
16] See Kahn (1967) for examples of real conflict situations 
and Staff of Strategy & Tactics Magazine (1977) for 
exposition of the history and current practices in 
conflict simulation gaming. 
17] The author has observed that new EIES members typically 
enter their credentials in initial directory listings, 
but that as they gain experience with the new medium, 
credential information gradually is supplanted by 
descriptions of topical interests. 
18] An interesting summary of current research findings on 
the potential biasing effect of personal appearance may 
be found in Bennetts (1978). 
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19] Even when members use their given names, in those cases 
where a name such as Robin is encountered, those not 
previously acquainted with the member may not always 
know if the member is male or female. Although 
evaluative research and experimentation has not been 
undertaken on the subject, it would seem, and has been 
reported anecdotally, that computerized conferencing 
offers women a forum in which sex discrimination is not 
encountered to the extent that it may be met in more 
conventional environments. 
20] In general, cueing anonymity could be of particular 
advantage to the physically handicapped or deformed 
person. The attention directed towards the handicapped, 
real or imagined, could sometimes be as debilitating as 
the handicap itself. 
21] This discussion of collections is based upon the 
specifications developed by Whitescarver and Turoff 
(1978). 
22] This statement appears in Turoff and Johnson-Lenz 
(1977), but was written by S. Roxanne Hiltz. 
23] A more complete listing of off-line functions and 
associated problems and opportunities appears in 
Bezilla (1977). 
24] A more thorough discussion of cue-emitting and cue-
searching in computerized conferencing will be given 
in Kerr and Bezilla (1978). 
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